Although there is no doubt that social security can help poverty reduction, their effect on poverty reduction can vary for different situations. This paper uses fixed-effects regression to estimate the effects of social security transfers including contributory pensions and social allowances on consumption expenditure of receiving households, and subsequently investigates the impact of the social security transfers on poverty in Vietnam. It is found that both pensions and social allowances increase expenditure of households, especially expenditure on non-food consumption. Pensions have a higher effect on expenditure than social allowances. Pensions and social allowances reduce poverty of the recipients as well as the whole population.
Introduction
There is a broad consensus that economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for poverty reduction. How strong a poverty-reducing effect economic growth has, depends on what happens to income distribution. Nowadays, many developing countries follow a pro-poor growth policy to promote both economic growth and poverty reduction. A strategy of pro-poor growth does not only focus on economic growth, but also affects the pattern of income distribution so that the poor can benefit from economic growth proportionally more than the rich, which will reduce the welfare gap between the poor and the rich, and finally eliminate poverty.
1 One of important policies of income redistribution is to provide social security transfers for the poor, vulnerable, and other targeted groups. Social security transfers are often provided in cash, but sometimes in kind or in vouchers. Cash transfers are relatively easy to deliver and allow the recipients to use cash in their optimal way.
2
The important role of the social security transfers in improving household welfare can be found in a large number of studies. For example, empirical studies such as Barrientos and DeJong (2006) , Maluccio (2005) , Gertlert (2000), Behrman and Hoddinott (2000) , Parker and Skoufias (2001) , Skoufias and McClafferty (2001) show that programs providing conditional cash transfers help the recipients reduce child labor, increase child schooling, and improving nutrition and health. Positive effect of social security transfers on income and consumption are also found in Devereux (2002) , , Sadoulet et al. (2001) , etc. Regarding impact on poverty, Morley and Cody (2003) find the Progresa program in Mexico helps the beneficiaries reduce the poverty gap by 36 percent.
However, the social transfers are not always a panacea for poverty reduction.
There are several reasons why a social transfer program has negligible impact on poverty reduction. Firstly, there can be high leakage rate of social transfer programs. Any 1 For discussion of pro-poor growth, for example, see Bhagwati (1988) , McKay (1996) , World Bank (1996) , Goudie and Ladd (1999) , Kakwani and Ernesto (2000) , Jörgen and Bigsten (2000) , Perkins et al. (2001) , etc. 2 The advantage of cash transfer are discussed in DFID (2005) , Farrington and Slater (2006) , Barrientos and DeJong (2006) , Gelan (2006) .
program would have leakage problems, i.e., the program covers not only eligible but also ineligible people. For example, in the Progresa program which are often mentioned as a successful targeting program, the 60 percent richest of population receive 20 percent of program benefits (Barrientos and DeJong, 2006) . The problem is also popular in developed countries. The poorest tend to receive less from social security program than the middle and the richest (Friedman and Friedman, 1979; Howe and Longman, 1992;  Castles ad Mitchell, 1993) . Secondly, the receipt of social transfers can mitigate the incentive to work of the recipients. The recipients become too dependent on social assistance, and they can fall into poverty when not receiving assistance (Dreze, 2005; Sahn and Alderman; 1996) . In an extreme situation, income of recipients of social transfer would have been lower than their income if they had not received the social transfers. In this case, the social transfers would have detrimental effects on the recipients' income and poverty reduction. Thirdly, there are some arguments that income redistribution can harm economic growth, thereby poverty reduction in the long run. For example, the Harrod-Domar model argues that economic development depends heavily on capital stock, and greater inequality would lead to higher growth rates. 3 Social transfers often require large funds from the State budget. As a result, the State can apply heavy or progressive taxation, which mitigate production and investment (Arrow, 1979; Lindbeck et al., 1994) .
Vietnam has committed itself to follow the "growth with equity" strategy as a principle to the development. Vietnam has achieved high economic growth with the annual GDP growth rate of around 6 percent during over the past 10 years. The poverty incidence has been reduced remarkably from 58 to 16 percent between 1993 and 2006.
The government of Vietnam has maintained an extensive social security system. There are several studies aiming to measure the effect of social security on household welfare. Van de Wall (2002) The paper is structured into 5 sections. The second describes data source, social security system in Vietnam. The third section presents the method to measure the impact of social transfers. Next, the fourth section presents the empirical findings on transfer impact. Finally, the fifth section concludes.
Pensions and social allowances in Vietnam
The study relies on data from the two Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys Most of pension benefits are paid in cash.
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The second type of the social security in Vietnam is the assistances and supports from the government and other organizations and enterprises, both domestic and international, to reduce economic shocks and poverty. The most important policies of the social assistances are the National Targeted Programs (NTP) and the social allowances.
The NTPs are conducted by the government with the objective to reduce poverty. The
NTPs provide the poor with several support programs such as education, health, production, construction of infrastructure, etc. The social allowances are the supports to some groups with difficulties such as war invalids, people with merit to the country during the war, old people and children who do not have someone to take care, people losing working capacity, and households adversely affected by natural calamities. Most of the social allowances are in form of cash. In some cases, the supports can be in kind such as food, clothes, production inputs and materials for housing repairs, etc. 6 In this paper, we investigate the poverty targeting and the impact of social allowances.
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It should be noted that if pensions and social allowances are provided for households in kind, VHLSS will report their equivalent values. Of course, households cannot have absolutely accurate valuation of received goods. However, the value of inkind transfers account for a negligible proportion of the total transfers.
If the poor receive larger pensions and social allowances, the effect of pensions and social allowances on poverty reduction will be higher. Table 1 For more information on the pension scheme in Vietnam, see Government, 1993a Government, , 1993b Government, , 1995 Government, , 1998 Government, and 2003 For more information on the social allowances in Vietnam, see Government, 1993b Government, , 2003 We do not evaluate programs under the NTPs. Since there are many programs, and the treatments of these program cannot be added (not in form of cash). In addition, the non-poor received a higher mount of pensions than the poor, and the difference in the pensions between the poor and non-poor tended to be higher during the period [2004] [2005] [2006] . The percentage of pensions over household income for the poor was a bit higher than for the non-poor. The amount and distribution of social allowances across the poor and non-poor are presented in Table 2 . In contrast to pensions, social allowances were more pro-poor. However, the poor received smaller average social allowances than the non-poor.
The average amount of social allowances received by the poor and non-poor households was 1029 and 2674 thousand VND in 2006, respectively. As a result, the non-poor accounted for 75.6 percent of allowance-receiving households, but 89 percent of the total amount of allowances in 2006. Table 3 presents per capita expenditure and poverty of households with and households without pensions. It shows that pension-receiving households have higher expenditure and lower poverty than non-receiving households. As expected, expenditure share on foods, both rice and non-rice, is lower for the recipients than the non-recipients.
The expenditure share on education and health, durables and other non-food items is for the pension recipients than the non-recipients.
Unlike the pension-receiving households, households receiving social allowances have lower expenditure and higher poverty than those not receiving allowances (Table   4 ). Households receiving social allowances have lower expenditure share on food but higher expenditure share on non-food items than households not receiving allowances. Although the poor also received pensions and social allowances, the non-poor received much higher amount of pensions and social allowances. However this targeting analysis does not take into account that consumption that is used to define the poor and non-poor can be affected already by pensions and social allowances. Some non-poor can be poor without pensions and social allowances. It is expected that transfers can help poverty reduction. The issues of impact evaluation of pensions and social allowances on household welfare and poverty will be discussed in the following sections. 
Impact evaluation method
The impact on household expenditure
To assess the impact of the receiving of pensions and allowances, we assume income or consumption can be specified as follows: 
where C ij is the expenditure on item j of household i. i Y is the total expenditure, and
. Then the share of expenditure on item j in the total expenditure is expressed as follows:
To examine whether receipts of pensions and allowances can change the expenditure share, we add these variables, other control variables, the time variables to equation (3) as follows:
The marginal effect of the receipts of pensions and allowances on the share of expenditure on item j is measured by parameter j γ .
The main problem in estimating the equation is the endogeneity of transfer receipt.
Receipt of pensions as well as social allowances can be correlated with unobserved characteristics of households. In this study, we use fixed-effect regressions to reduce endogeneity bias. Fixed-effects regressions assume that unobserved variables which are correlated with the receipt of pensions as well as social allowances are time-invariants.
By transformation of data, fixed-effects model remove these time-invariant unobserved variables ( i ν in equation (1) and ij π in equation (4)).
The impact on expenditure poverty
In this paper, poverty is measured by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes which can all be calculated using the following formula (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984) . Since poverty indexes are not a continuous function of expenditure, we cannot estimate the effect of pensions and allowances on poverty indexes by deriving the derivative of poverty index with respect to the variable of pensions and allowances.
However, we can measure the impact of pensions and social allowance receipt on a poverty index P t of the recipients at the time t using as the follow formula:
where 1 Y and 0 Y denote the expenditure of the transfer-receiving households in the presence and absence of the transfers, respectively. Suppose we measure the effect of pension receipt, and D denotes the receipt of pensions. The effect of allowance receipt is estimated using the same estimation strategy. The first term in the right-hand side of (5) is the poverty measure of the receiving households with pensions, and this term is observed and estimated directly from the data. The second term in the right-hand side of (5) is the counterfactual measure of poverty, i.e., the poverty index of the receiving households if they had not received pensions. This term is not observed directly, and it is estimated using the estimated parameters in equation (1). Using equation (1), the observed expenditure of household i at time t can be expressed as follows: (7) and after simple algebra, we can get: It is possible to estimate the impact of the receipt of pensions or social allowances on the total poverty as follows:
where P(Y) is the observed poverty index of all population (in which the recipients received pensions or allowances), and ) Y ( P 0 is the poverty index of all population if the recipients had not received the pensions or social allowances. It should be noted that (9) is different from the effect on poverty if all the households receive pensions (or allowances):
where ) Y ( P t 1 is the poverty indexes if all the households receive pensions or allowances.
In this study, we do not estimate (10) since it is unrealistic that pensions as well as allowances are provided for all the households at a point of time.
We estimate the standard error of the estimates of the impact on poverty indexes by using a non-parametric bootstrap technique. 
Results of impact estimation
In this section, we present empirical findings on the impact pensions and social allowances on expenditure pattern and poverty using the fixed-effect regression. The receipt of pensions mainly increases non-food consumption including health care and education, and other non-food consumption excluding durables. It should be noted that we combine expenditure on health and expenditure on education so that the variable of spending on health and expenditure is larger than 0 for all households and we can get log of this variable. The receipt of allowances reduces the rice consumption but increases the non-rice food consumption. It also increases non-food consumption including health care and education, and other non-food consumption excluding durables. Table 6 shows the effect of pensions and allowances on expenditure shares.
Receiving pensions does not have a statistically significant effect on expenditure shares.
However, receiving allowances change the expenditure pattern of households. More specifically, it reduces the share of expenditure on rice and durables, but increases the expenditure share on non-rice food consumption. The impact estimation of social allowances is presented in Table 8 . Estimates of impact on the poverty incidence are statistically significant at the 10% level. The receipt of social allowances reduced the poverty incidence of the recipients by around 2.3 and 1.7 percentage points in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Social allowances also helped the recipients decreased their poverty gap and poverty severity. Social allowances also contribute to reduction of the total poverty. It is interesting that the impacts of social allowances on total poverty reduction are higher than the impacts of pensions. This is because social allowances cover a larger proportion of the poor than pensions.
Conclusions
Social security transfers are often mentioned as important external sources of income for the poor and vulnerable household to cope with socioeconomic shocks and to get rid of poverty. Using data from the household surveys, we investigate how well contributory pensions and social assistance allowances reach the poor and to which extent these transfers affect household expenditure and poverty.
It is found that the non-poor households tended to receive larger pensions than the poor households. This is because pensions are based on the contributory scheme. Only people who worked in formal sectors can have pensions, and the non-poor are more likely to have formal jobs than the poor. Only 2.6 percent of the poor households received pensions in 2006, while this figure for the non-poor was 11.6 percent. In contrast, social allowances reached the poor better than pensions. The proportion of households receiving social allowances was 25.6 and 12.4 percent for the poor and nonpoor households, respectively. Regarding the average amount of transfers, the non-poor received higher amount of transfers, both pensions and allowances, than the poor.
To measure impact of pensions and social allowances, we apply the fixed-effect regression using panel data. It is showed that the receipt of pensions and allowances increases per capita expenditure by around 6 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively. The effect of pensions was much larger than that of social allowances, since the average amount of pensions was substantially larger than the average amount of social allowances. Interestingly, pensions and allowances mainly increase expenditure on health care, education and non-food consumption excluding durables. Social allowances also have a positive effect on non-rice consumption but a negative effect on rice consumption. Pensions as well as social allowances also contribute to reduction of the total poverty. It is interesting that the impacts of social allowances on total poverty reduction are higher than the impacts of pensions. This is because social allowances cover a larger proportion of the poor than pensions. Since the coverage of pensions and social allowances is rather small, their impacts on total poverty are very small. 
